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Criminal Histories and Criminal
Futures
YOUNGJAE LEE∗
Richard S. Frase and Julian V. Roberts. Paying for the Past: The Case Against Prior
Record Sentence Enhancements. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, 336
pp., $74.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-190-25400-1

In the United States and elsewhere,
when a person with a criminal
record is convicted of a new crime
and is sentenced, his or her criminal
record plays a significant role in the
sentencing determination. But in
what way exactly is the criminal
record taken into account, and can
we justify the practice? Richard
Frase and Julian Roberts’1 book,
Paying for the Past: The Case Against
Prior Record Sentence Enhancements,
undertakes a detailed study of this
topic by focusing on sentencing data
from jurisdictions that employ sentencing guidelines in the United States.
The authors ultimately conclude that
“across US guidelines systems (and
likely in other jurisdictions as well),
repeat offenders are routinely subject
to levels of punishment that cannot
be justified,” and that “the magnitude
and rigidity of prior record enhancements in the United States generate
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criminal penalties that are unnecessarily severe, undeserved, and
harmful” (xiv). The literature on the
issue of using the criminal record in
sentencing is large at this point, due
in significant part to the authors’ sustained focus on this issue over time.2
Even so, the authors’ amalgamation,
analysis, and presentation of sentencing data, fair and detailed conclusions based on data, and sensible
recommendations for reform make
the book an invaluable source of
insight and wisdom on an enormously consequential topic.
The authors define “criminal
record” as “record of prior convictions” (xi), and a “guidelines
system” as a sentencing system in
which judges who sentence are presented with a set of recommended
sentences for crimes where such recommended sentences are made by
“a legislatively created sentencing
guidelines commission,” as opposed
to by the legislature itself (238). Jurisdictions that meet this definition of
“guidelines system” and are thus
included in this study consist of
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seventeen states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal jurisdiction.3 Among the guidelines systems,
the authors distinguish between
“grid” and “non-grid” systems.
“Grid” systems (fourteen jurisdictions) take into account criminal
history by assigning crimes to different rows and criminal history levels
to different columns. A judge who is
sentencing a person is to identify the
correct row and the correct column
to identify the applicable cell, which
contains the recommended sentence.
In “non-grid” guidelines systems
(the remaining five jurisdictions),
criminal history may be taken into
account in different ways, through
worksheets, recommended sentencing ranges, or applications of
general principles (221–26).
The guidelines method is not the
only way to take into account a
person’s criminal history. As the
authors describe, in other common
law jurisdictions like England and
Wales, New Zealand, and Australia,
judges are to take into account criminal history at sentencing, and how
they do so is left to judicial discretion
(3–4). The authors focus on guidelines
systems because such systems collect
extensive sentencing data and clearly
articulate the role that criminal histories of individuals play at sentencing (xiii). At times, the authors
focus only on grid systems among
guidelines systems because it is
easier to make comparisons among
grid systems than to compare
between grid and non-grid systems
or between non-grid systems (91).
And among grid systems, the
authors sometimes single out North
Carolina, Minnesota, Washington,
and Kansas as points of comparison,
as those jurisdictions show not only
a range of the size of the prior

record enhancement but are also
easy to compare due to various features of the systems (159–61).
However, general lessons derived
from these systems should be applicable to all systems that consider criminal history when determining
sentences.
So how does it all work? First,
there is the matter of understanding
the concept of “criminal record.” As
the authors emphasize, “criminal
record” is made up of a number of
different elements, and such elements
are entered into criminal history “formulas” to generate a “criminal history
score” or “criminal history points” in
guidelines systems (5–7). The most
obvious way in which the term “criminal record” is used is to refer to prior
adult convictions for felonies, but
there is more to it than that. Some jurisdictions count misdemeanors, and
some jurisdictions include juvenile
offenses, though both of those tend
to weigh less in criminal history calculations than adult felony convictions
(106). Does the number of convictions
matter? In most guidelines systems,
the answer is yes. Do violent crimes
count more, and do prior crimes that
are the same or similar to the current
crime count more? The answers are
yes and yes, at least in some jurisdictions. Also, a majority of guidelines
systems add additional points to
current offenses committed while
under state custody or supervision
stemming from prior convictions
(106). Some, but not all, systems do
not count old convictions or convictions that were followed by a significant crime-free period (5, 44–46, 107,
164, 166–69). The meaning of “prior”
also can make a difference. In some
jurisdictions, the prior conviction
counts as a prior conviction only if it
is entered before the current offense
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is committed, but, as the authors note,
most guidelines systems count a conviction as a “prior” conviction as
long as the “prior” conviction has
been entered before the sentencing
for the current offense, even if the
current offense is committed before
the prior conviction has been entered
(108).
What exactly is the impact of criminal record, thus translated to criminal
history scores, on sentencing? As the
authors explain, the impact manifests
in two ways. First, whether one has a
criminal history can have a significant
impact on whether one is imprisoned
as opposed to receiving a “community-based,” or noncustodial, sentence (91–96). Second, one’s criminal
history level has a significant impact
on the duration of one’s prison sentence (97–105). The authors dub
these two effects “disposition” and
“duration” effects respectively and
show that they vary widely in different jurisdictions (90–105).
Both effects are important for
those facing sentencing, as the “disposition” effect determines whether one
goes to a prison, whereas the “duration” effect determines for how
long one is to be in prison. To illustrate the importance of the “disposition” effect, the authors note that in
2014, 32% of all persons sentenced to
prison in Washington state were thus
sentenced, as opposed to receiving a
community-based sentence, solely
because of their criminal records
(95). That is, those sentenced would
have been given noncustodial sentences for their offenses had they not
had a criminal history. The “duration”
effect varies across different types of
offenses (98–100) and different jurisdictions (100–101). The authors
report that, on average, “the recommended custody sentence for the

most serious recidivist is more than
six times longer than the sentence recommended for the first offender convicted of the same offense” (100). In
the twelve jurisdictions studied to
arrive at this average of six, the
figures range from 1.7 (Washington,
D.C.) to 14.4 (Kansas).
Criminal history thus plays an
enormous role in sentencing determinations through disposition and duration effects, and, the authors argue,
such sentencing determinations have
greatly detrimental impacts on the
overall criminal justice system and
society. Namely, an emphasis on criminal history at sentencing can lead to
outcomes that are contrary to the
kinds of sentencing goals that should
attract broad support, such as proportionality in sentencing, here defined
as the idea that “more serious crimes
should attract correspondingly more
severe sanctions” (115), not housing
in prisons those who commit nonviolent offenses, and not imprisoning
those who are, due to their age, unlikely to reoffend (114–23). Criminal
history’s role in sentencing is also “a
major contributor to racially disproportionate prison and jail populations”
(151) and “greatly increase[s] prison
bed needs and prison operating
costs” (161).
Given such costs of the use of criminal record in sentencing determinations, what does society gain from
the practice? Are there crime prevention benefits from the recidivist
premium? There are many ways to
imagine crime prevention benefits of
increased sentences for repeat offenders. To think this through, let’s
imagine a number of people in a jurisdiction that employs a recidivist
premium and call the persons A, B,
C, D, E, and so on. A, B, C, and D
commit a crime together. A, B, and C
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are then caught and punished,
whereas D evades detection. A is a
first-time offender, B is a secondtime offender, and C is a third-time
offender. D is a first-time offender,
too, but is not caught. E has not committed a crime. A receives a noncustodial sanction whereas B, due to his
criminal history, is sentenced to
prison. C, due to his enhanced criminal history, receives a longer prison
sentence than the one B receives.
What is the impact of this sort of
policy on crime prevention? The
rationale of the policy might be to
incapacitate those who are most
likely to reoffend, and one might
expect fewer crimes to be committed
once A, B, and C are incapacitated.
In this scenario, let’s say, then, that,
as one might hope, A, B, and C do
not commit another crime while
being sanctioned, custodial or not.
Does this lower the crime rate in the
society? Not necessarily. The crime
rate may stay the same if D continues
to commit crimes by himself or
simply recruits a new person, E, to
commit a crime. One might then say
this shows that we have to be better
at catching someone like D. Perhaps,
but that still not would not prevent
E from taking D’s place and recruiting, F, G, H, and so on. This is the
sense in which punitiveness may not
lead to an overall crime reduction, as
long as the market for criminals is in
operation, where there is a
“demand” for criminal activities and
a “supply” of those willing to
engage in such conduct (74). But
does the recidivist premium, by
making salient the consequences of
living a life of crime, not serve as
warning to deter D, E, F, G, H and
so on? By increasing the severity of
sanctions for those with criminal
history, one can perhaps deter

persons with no criminal histories
and prevent them from entering the
market for offenders, or at least
make it less likely. The authors,
though, doubt that this is the case,
noting that “[t]he research literature
on incapacitation … casts considerable doubt on the benefits of recidivist
sentencing premiums as a crime
control measure” (73). They also
note studies showing generally that
changes in the severity of punishments have little impact on aggregate
crime rates (74).
Could we hypothesize at least that
B and C learn their lessons from being
punished more harshly as repeat
offenders, and that such increased
punishments make them less likely to
reoffend, even if the overall crime
rate does not change? That is, if B, a
second-time offender, is not given a
prison sentence and if such leniency
might make B more likely to reoffend,
then the decision to impose a prison
sentence due to his criminal record
would make sense. But the authors
doubt this is the case, as their review
of studies leads them to conclude
that “prison is not associated with
lower recidivism rates than less
severe penalties,” and cites several
studies, including one showing that
“re-offending rates were lower for
offenders assigned to a community
sanction rather than a custodial
order” (80). What about the impact
of the longer prison sentence on C
for being a third-time offender? That
is, if C, a third-time offender, were
not given a longer prison sentence,
and were instead treated just like B,
a second-time offender, then perhaps
the shorter sentence would make C
more likely to reoffend once C is
released. The authors doubt this is
the case as well, again discussing
several studies and noting especially
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one study’s conclusion that there is
“no clear effect of length of imprisonment on recidivism” (82). In fact, the
authors note, “there is … a mild but
detectable criminogenic short-term
effect of imprisonment,” as “prison
is associated with slightly higher reoffending rates” when “compared to
community-based sanctions,” and
“for some offenders, longer prison
terms increase the odds of further
crime” (88).
Perhaps the differing treatments of
A, B, and C can be justified as a way of
keeping control over those who are
likely to reoffend. Guideline systems
make, after all, as the authors note,
an assumption that “prior convictions
provide a useful proxy for recidivism
risk” (41). The authors observe that
“that assumption is well supported
by research” (41) in that “[r]esearch
has repeatedly shown that, in
general, repeat offenders have a
higher risk of re-offending than first
offenders, and that recidivism risk
generally rises with increases in the
number of prior convictions” (42). In
that case, the emphasis on criminal
history at sentencing seems to make
sense as a general matter, but that is
not all there is to it.
First, even if criminal record is a
reliable predictor of recidivism, there
is a separate question as to whether
guidelines’ designs appropriately
track the data on the relationship
between criminal record and recidivism risk. As suggested above in the
example of A, B, and C, a typical
guideline assigns a sanction to an
offense for someone with no criminal
history and then increases the severity
of the sanction in a linear fashion as
the criminal history score increases,
though the precise way in which the
sanction increases varies (7–8). The
sanctions may increase by a fixed

percentage as criminal history
increases or by a fixed number of
months (8), though the “slope” of
the increase varies across different jurisdictions, and within jurisdictions
depending on the seriousness of
offenses (97–101).
Despite these variations, the
authors argue that the guidelines all
suffer from the same problem: a
linear function is not justified by the
data on recidivism risk. Focusing on
studies of three jurisdictions —
federal, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania
— the authors point out that the
difference in recidivism risks of
those in the lowest criminal history
category (call it level 1) and those in
the next level up (call it level 2) is
much bigger than the corresponding
differences between those in level 2
and those in level 3, between those
in level 3 and those in level 4, and so
on (49). In fact, the recidivism risk
does not increase significantly once
criminal history hits a certain level
(50–51). The current design of guidelines assumes a constant increase
across criminal history categories,
and, as a result, “a dramatic increase
in severity is often imposed to
achieve what appears to be a modest
increase in prevention” (52). The
authors conclude that the current
guidelines are in this respect “unsupported by the recidivism research,”
given that “as a general rule, minor
increases in ascribed risk should
attract equally modest increments in
severity” (52).
Second, the authors note that in
many guidelines systems “an offender’s prior convictions never go
away” (164), and argue that such an
eternal-record approach cannot be
justified given that people’s risk of
offending declines over time as they
age (64, 161, 164, 170, 179) and that
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research shows that “offenders with a
crime-free gap of seven or more years
have much lower recidivism risk than
offenders with shorter gaps” (179).
The authors are similarly critical of
the practice of counting juvenile
offenses (though the authors concede
some uncertainty over whether juvenile priors are predictive of higher
adult recidivism risk, given mixed
studies) (184–88) and adult misdemeanor convictions (given that
“most people commit minor criminal
violations at some point,” while
including misdemeanor priors into
criminal history scores makes such
scores only slightly more predictive
of recidivism) (188–89). The authors
also question the practice of taking
into account a person’s custody
status at the time of reoffending
(seeing “limited research validation”
on whether the factor predicts a
higher risk of recidivism) (196), similarity of current offense to previous
offenses (noting that “the limited
empirical research has generated
inconsistent findings” on the predictive power of similarity in offenses
committed over time) (197–203), and
seriousness of previous offenses
(noting that “the severity level of
prior crimes is not a good predictor
of either the frequency or the severity
of later offending”) (203–5).
Third, guidelines systems may be
not only taking into account factors
that are poor predictors of risk of recidivism, but may also be failing to take
into account factors that are predictive
of recidivism. Are there other, potentially better, predictors of likelihood
of reoffending? The generalization
that “repeat offenders have a higher
risk of re-offending” (42) may be
valid, but there are other factors that
are predictors of recidivism, either
by themselves or in combination

with criminal history. The authors
note that age, gender, substance
abuse, employment history, “criminal
thinking patterns,” and “antisocial
personality features” are also good
predictors of re-offending (64). Some
guidelines systems, though not all,
take some of these factors into
account (61–69).
In sum, criminal history plays a
huge role at sentencing in guidelines
jurisdictions, such sentencing practices carry enormous costs, and the
benefits gained from them are small,
especially because the guidelines are
poorly designed and applied in ways
that are not supported by data.
The authors make a number of recommendations for reform, such as: not
counting juvenile adjudications and
adult misdemeanors for criminal
history
determinations
(212–13),
having adult convictions “decay”
and “expire” after a number of years
(213), not enhancing on the basis of
custody status of a person at the time
of the current offense (214–15), adjusting the slope of the increase in severity
of sanctions as criminal history
accumulates so that it is not a straight
line up at an angle, but rather
resembles an ice-hockey stick held
upside down (a sharp incline
between the first two criminal history
categories and then much smaller
increases as criminal history increases)
(112, 215–16), putting a cap on the size
of the recidivist premium so that the
sentence for an offense by a person in
the highest category of criminal
history is never more than twice the
sentence for the same offense by a
person in the lowest category of criminal history (216), imposing imprisonment “only where the current offense
is of at least a medium level of severity,
and where the current and at least one
prior crime involved actual violence or
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potential for serious harm” (217), and
giving judges discretion to depart
from guidelines when they sentence
(218).
One issue I have not mentioned thus
far is the issue of desert: Are repeat
offenders more blameworthy than
first-time offenders? If A and B
commit a crime together and are prosecuted and sentenced, and A and B are
equal in every way except that A is a
first-time offender and B is secondtime offender, is B more blameworthy
than A? There is a widespread intuition
that a second-time offender is more
blameworthy than a first-time offender
and that punishments ought to reflect
such differences, and sentencing guidelines typically mention this intuition in
explaining their treatments of criminal
history (23–24). However, as we have
seen, “criminal record” is not a simple
unidimensional metric, as there are
many different ways to incorporate
criminal record into sentencing, and a
simple, vague intuition that repeat
offenders deserve more can neither prescribe nor justify particular sentencing
practices. More detailed theoretical prescriptions are needed, and such prescriptions cannot be devised without a
fuller theory that gives an account of
the culpability of repeat offending.
The authors survey and evaluate
different proposals that have been
defended by desert theorists, from
those that say that criminal history
does not increase culpability, to those
that say that lack of criminal history
should be a mitigating factor only,
and to those that say presence of criminal history should be an aggravating
factor (24–38). The authors identify an
area of consensus among these theorists and conclude that “[n]o retributive
account justifies a powerful role for previous convictions as an aggravating
factor at sentencing” and that “in

terms of the foundational justification
for taking a prior record into account,
the retributive analysis is less compelling than the risk-based rationales”
(38–39). This conclusion allows the
authors to give considerations of
desert a secondary role in the book
and to focus instead on the question
of the relationship between criminal
history and recidivism risk (39).
However, because the authors are committed to the general principle that
punishments must be “justified both
by principles of desert and by crime
prevention goals” (209), they return to
the issue of desert and seek, throughout
the book, to “ensure that criminal
history enhancements do not depart
markedly from the requirement of
offense-based proportionality” (39).
For instance, the authors discuss
my desert-based argument that
people who are convicted and punished incur a special obligation to set
their life straight, and that their reoffending indicates a failure to do so,
thereby increasing the risk of further
reoffending (35–36). This theory, I
have argued previously, implies that
the recidivist premium should not be
larger than the punishment for the
offense
without the recidivist
premium, since the additional wrong
essentially consists of risking reoffending, as opposed to committing the
second offense itself.4 The authors
note that this conclusion is consistent
with their view that “offenders with
the longest records should not
receive penalties more than twice as
severe as the penalties given to first
offenders who commit the same
offense” (36). I have also previously
argued that my proposed desert
account of repeat offenders implies
that “repeat offenders ought to be
able to present the ways in which
they have tried to steer clear of
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criminality and, depending on the
reasonableness and sincerity of their
attempts, receive a reduction in the
recidivist premium.”5 The authors
note their agreement with this view
as well (19), as they argue that “the
rising culpability of repeat offending
should only be a presumption, rebuttable by the offender” if the offender
“has taken steps to correct the causes
of his reoffending” (39). The authors
also note, and I agree, that an implication of my particular account is
that “any period of desistance … is
worthy of praise and makes the offender less culpable for later crimes”
(172), which supports the authors’ recommendation that the impact of previous convictions should diminish
over time and expire at some point
(178–81). Finally, I have also argued
in favor of mitigation when the government has made it difficult for a
person to resume a law-abiding life
by placing numerous roadblocks to
reintegration in the form of collateral
consequences.6 Similarly, the authors
show some sensitivity to the issue of
the state’s own role in producing
criminality, especially in minority
communities, through “criminogenic
consequences of imprisonment” (83),
“compound[ing
of]
individual,
family, and community disadvantage,” and “reinforce(ment of) the
perception … of
systemic
and
societal unfairness,” which “undermines the effectiveness of punishment
and crime control effects generally”
(132). All in all, the authors’ careful
attention throughout the book to the
question of desert, even as they
focus mainly on the question of the
relationship between criminal history
and recidivism risk, is one of many
strengths of this book.
A question to which the authors
devote only a limited amount of

space, but that will become increasingly important in sentencing policy,
is the use of various risk-assessment
tools in sentencing decisions.7 This
book is not about that trend, but
about taking stock of what we know
after decades of experience with sentencing guidelines. The authors do
note the existence and increasing use
of risk assessment tools and cautiously
endorse them, as they favor “improv
[ing] the accuracy and efficiency of
predicted risk” by taking into
account “at least some of the welldocumented risk factors beyond criminal history” in a variety of ways (71).
The authors also recommend placing
persons in different risk categories
(216–17), though they are aware of
some of the legal and ethical difficulties associated with such a practice
(84–87). Technological improvements
and the growing popularity of riskassessment instruments are likely to
lead us into a world in which criminal
history ends up becoming just one of
many factors that decision makers
use to issue “risk reports” on individuals. Some day we may even reach a
state where new generations wonder
what all the fuss about criminal
history was about, but in that new
world, scrutinizing our sentencing
tools from the moral perspective will
not cease to be relevant. Questions
about desert, questions about the relevance of desert to criminal law and
punishment, and moral reflections
about responsibility and culpability
are going to be of continued pressing
importance. This book does something that will be of lasting significance through all the flashy new
trends and advances — it provides a
model of evidence-informed criminal
justice policy making that does not
lose sight of considerations of morality
and humanity.
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Notes
1 Although the book lists Richard Frase
and Julian Roberts as the authors, Rhys
Hester is credited as a third co-author of chapters five through eight. For the sake of simplicity, this review uses the term “authors” to
refer to either “Frase and Roberts” or “Frase,
Roberts, and Hester” without distinguishing
between the two uses.
2 See e.g. Frase, Just Sentencing; Roberts,
Punishing Persistent Offenders; Roberts and
Von Hirsch, Previous Convictions at Sentencing. This journal has had a role in the
history of this literature as well, by, in part,
printing an early, significant intervention in
the literature in its very first volume. See
Fletcher, “The Recidivist Premium”; see
also Von Hirsch, “Criminal Record Rides
Again.” As the authors note throughout

the book, I have taken part in this debate
as well. See Lee, “Recidivism as Omission”;
Lee, “Repeat Offenders.”
3 The seventeen states are Alabama,
Arkansas, Minnesota, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington (238).
4 See Lee, “Recidivism as Omission,” 618.
5 See ibid., 616.
6 See ibid., 618–20.
7 See Garrett and Monahan, “Judging
Risk”; Huq, “Racial Equity”; Collins, “Punishing Risk”; Starr, “Evidence-based
Sentencing.”
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